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Model-Agnostic Private Learning via Stability
Raef Bassily∗ Om Thakkar† Abhradeep Thakurta‡
Abstract
We design differentially private learning algorithms that are agnostic to the learning model.
Our algorithms are interactive in nature, i.e., instead of outputting a model based on the training
data, they provide predictions for a set of m feature vectors that arrive online. We show that,
for the feature vectors on which an ensemble of models (trained on random disjoint subsets of
a dataset) makes consistent predictions (i.e., the models sufficiently agree on a given prediction
value), there is almost no-cost of privacy in generating accurate predictions for those feature
vectors. To that end, we provide a novel coupling of the distance to instability framework with
the sparse vector technique.
We provide algorithms with formal privacy and utility guarantees for both binary/multi-
class classification, and soft-label classification (where the label is a score ∈ [0, 1]). For binary
classification in the standard (agnostic) PAC model, we show how to bootstrap from our pri-
vately generated predictions to construct a computationally efficient generic private learner
that outputs a final accurate hypothesis from the given concept class. In particular, our con-
struction – to the best of our knowledge – is the first computationally efficient construction
for a label-private learner. We prove sample complexity upper bounds for this setting in both
the realizable and the non-realizable (agnostic) cases. As in non-private sample complexity
bounds, the only relevant property of the concept class in our bounds is its VC dimension. For
soft-label classification, our techniques are based on exploiting the stability properties of tradi-
tional learning algorithms, like stochastic gradient descent (SGD). We provide a new technique
to boost the average-case stability properties of learning algorithms to strong (worst-case) sta-
bility properties, and then exploit them to obtain differentially private classification algorithms.
In the process, we also show that a large class of SGD methods satisfy average-case stability
properties, in contrast to a smaller class of SGD methods that are uniformly stable as shown in
prior work.
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1 Introduction
We study the problem of classification of public unlabeled data {x1, · · · , xm} ⊆ X when the learn-
ing algorithm A is given a private training dataset D. The goal is to enable answering as many
classification queries as possible while ensuring the privacy of the training set. Most of the prior
work on differentially private machine learning has focused on the “once and for all” approach,
where a differentially private algorithm is first used to train the private dataset, and then output a
model (or a classifier) θ that can be later used be used for performing the desired learning tasks. A
major issue with this approach is that the accuracy guarantee of such private learners (or equiva-
lently, their sample complexity) usually suffer from an explicit dependence on the dimensionality
of the problem (see, e.g., [CMS11, KST12, ST13, BST14]), or the size of the feature space, even
for simple tasks like learning threshold functions [BNSV15]. Such a dependency may limit the
utility of this approach, especially in modern machine learning where data is high-dimensional,
and models are complex and over-parameterized.
To deal with this issue, we take a different approach. Instead of training an algorithm to output a
“safe” model that can be used indefinitely, we ensure that the predictions made by the algorithm in
response to a number of (classification) queries preserve differential privacy. This approach allows
us to produce privatized predictions whose accuracy is very close to that of non-private learners as
long as the number of queriesm is not too large. Roughly speaking, this approach allows to achieve
accuracy that is almost the same as that of non-private learners, at the expense of increasing the
sample complexity (compared to that of the non-private learner) by a factor that does not depend
on the model, or the complexity of the learning problem. It only depends on the number of queries
(out of them queries) that are “bad” in some natural sense. Hence, the limiting factor becomes the
number of those “bad” queries rather than the dimensionality, or the complexity of the problem.
Moreover, this approach enables using any non-private learner in a black-box fashion, with the
offered utility guarantees being relative to those of the underlying non-private learner. Hence, our
algorithms can be used in very general settings. Also, having a black-box access to any generic
learner may be appealing from a practical standpoint as well.
Another significant advantage of this approach is that the privately generated labels (the an-
swers to the m queries) can then be used together with queried feature vectors to train a new
model. Since differential privacy is closed under post-processing, the final model is safe for publi-
cation and can be used to answer subsequent classification queries indefinitely. This technique has
been commonly referred to as semi-supervised knowledge transfer. In the context of privacy, this
technique has been explored in [HCB16]. It has also been extended and empirically investigated
in [PAE+17], but without formal guarantees. Using our constructions, we explicitly show how to
achieve this task efficiently, and prove non-trivial upper bounds on the sample complexity in the
standard (agnostic) PAC model.
Prior theoretical work in this area [CMS11, KST12, ST13, BST14, TTZ15, WLK+17] has ex-
clusively studied the setting where the underlying learning problem satisfies convexity properties.
Since modern machine learning involves non-convex models, another motivation for this work is to
provide differentially private learning algorithms with formal utility guarantees without invoking
any convexity assumptions. Our algorithms and analyses solely rely on the stability properties of
the underlying training procedure on the private dataset D. By stability, we mean that the behav-
ior of the training procedure should not change significantly by adding (removing) a few entries
to (from) the dataset D. Few recent works [WFS15, ACG+16, PAE+17, PSM+18] have studied
private non-convex learning, but they do not provide any formal utility guarantees. Analyzing non-
convex learning algorithms with differential privacy is especially hard because in many cases, the
robustness of the underlying learning models is not well-understood.
Algorithmic idea: Suppose that a model class is independently trained k times, each time with the
same number of training examples given to the learning algorithm. Naturally, one would expect
the corresponding output classifiers θ1, · · · , θk to predict “similarly” on a new example from the
same distribution. Using this idea, we design differentially private algorithms that are agnostic to
the underlying learning problem.
The constructions in [PAE+17, PSM+18] empirically exhibit a similar behavior, but no formal
guarantees are provided for it. Furthermore, [ST13, PAE+17, PSM+18] consider the setting where
the final output is a discrete object (e.g., a set of features, or a hard label ∈ {0, 1}). Our results
are more general, and extend to the setting where the predictions are soft-labels (i.e., they can lie
in the interval [0, 1]) rather than being restricted to hard labels. We provide a detailed comparison
with the relevant prior work in Section 1.2.
Our Techniques: Our algorithms build on the sub-sample and aggregate framework of [NRS07,
ST13], and are most related to the framework of [ST13] which is based on the stability idea de-
scribed earlier. We combine this framework with the sparse vector technique [DRV10, HR10,
DR+14] to show that amongm classification queries, one only needs to “pay the price of privacy”
for the queries that result in an unstable histogram for predictions by the classifiers θ1, . . . , θk.
1.1 Our Contributions
A private framework for stable online queries. We provide a generic algorithm that extends the
sample and aggregate framework to enable answering m online queries on a private dataset. Our
algorithm is guaranteed to answer allm queries with high accuracy only if the number of unstable
queries (in the sense of [ST13]) does not exceed a certain cutoff value T which is given as input
parameter. Our algorithm is guaranteed to satisfy differential privacy regardless of whether this
condition is satisfied1. The utility on the other hand depends on this condition. In particular, our
construction implies an upper bound on the sample complexity that scales ≈ √T . Note this result
does not contradict with the existing lower bounds of
√
m (e.g., see [DSS+15, SU15]) since those
lower bounds are applicable under a weaker set of assumptions. In particular, we can circumvent
those bounds only in scenarios where there is a guarantee that the number of unstable queries does
not exceed T = o(m).
Privately answering binary classification queries. In Section 4.1, we show how to use our
framework to construct generic private algorithm for answering binary classification queries on
public data based on private training data. Given a non-private (agnostic) PAC learner for a hy-
pothesis class H of VC-dimension V and a private training set of n examples, we can answer m
classification queries with a misclassification rate of O˜ (mV 2/n2) in the realizable case for suffi-
1We also provide a corrected proof for the privacy guarantee of the distance to instability framework in [ST13]
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ciently large m , namely, for all m ≥ Ω ((n/V )4/3). This implies that in the realizable setting,
we can answer up to ≈ (n/V )4/3 queries with misclassification rate ≈ (V/n)2/3, i.e., only a factor
of ≈ (n/V )1/3 worse than the optimal non-private miscalssification rate. Similarly, in the ag-
nostic (non-realizable) case, we can achieve misclassification rate of O˜
(
m1/3V 2/3/n2/3
)
for all
m ≥ Ω ((n/V )4/5). In particular, this implies that in the non-realizable setting, we can answer up
to ≈ (n/V )4/5 queries with misclassification rate ≈ (V/n)2/5, i.e., only a factor of ≈ (n/V )1/10
worse than the optimal non-private miscalssification rate. Furthermore, our algorithm does not
require any extra assumptions on the hypothesis class H beyond what is assumed in the non-
private setting. As mentioned earlier, the existing bounds in differentially private PAC learning
[BLR08, KLN+11, BNS13, BNSV15] do not depend on m, but on the other hand, they either
assume that the hypothesis class is finite, or they suffer from explicit dependence on the size of the
domain even for simple classes with VC-dimension 1.
Efficient label-private learning: In Section 4.2, we build on our results above to achieve a
stronger objective than merely answering classification queries. In particular, we show how to
bootstrap from our construction a computationally efficient private learner that publishes an accu-
rate classifier, which can then be used to answer indefinite number of classification queries. In
particular, our learner provide privacy guarantees in either one of the following scenarios: (i) a
scenario where only the labels of the training set are considered private information, or (ii) a sce-
nario where the entire training sample is private but the learner has access to public unlabeled data
from the same distribution. We prove sample complexity upper bounds for both realizable and
non-realizable settings in the standard (agnostic) PAC model. Our bounds can be summarized as
follows:
Informal Theorem 1.1 (Corresponding to Theorems 4.6, 4.7). Let H be a hypothesis class of
VC-dimension V . Let 0 < β ≤ α < 1. Let n be the size of the private training set and let
m = O
(
V+log(1/β)
α2
)
be the number of unlabeled public feature vectors. There is an efficient
(ǫ, δ)-differentially private algorithm (instantiation of Algorithm 4) that generates labels for allm
feature vectors, then use the new labeled set of m points as another training set for a non-private
(agnostic) PAC learner, which finally outputs a hypothesis hˆ ∈ H (see Algorithm 5). The following
guarantees hold for the realizable and the agnostic settings:
• Realizable case: if n = O˜ (V 3/2/α3/2) , then, w.p. ≥ 1− β, we have err(hˆ;D) = O(α).
• Agnostic case: if n = O˜ (V 3/2/α5/2) , then, w.p. ≥ 1 − β, we have err(hˆ;D) = O(α + γ)
(where γ = min
h∈H
err(h;D)).
Our bound in the realizable case is only a factor of O˜(
√
V/α) worse than the optimal non-
private sample complexity, where V is the VC dimension of the concept class and α is the achiev-
able accuracy. In the agnostic case, our bound exhibits the same connection to the optimal non-
private sample complexity, however, we note that the accuracy of the output hypothesis in this case
may have a suboptimal dependency (by a small constant factor) on γ , min
h∈H
err(h;D).
4
Label-private learning has been explored before in [CH11] and [BNS16]. Both works have
only considered pure, i.e., (ǫ, 0), differentially private learners and their constructions are compu-
tationally inefficient. We give a more detailed comparison with previous work in Section 4.2.
Privately answering classification queries for soft-label classification. In Section 5, we consider
the private soft-label classification problem, where for each feature vector x ∈ X the objective
is to output a label in the range [0, 1]. Soft-labels (or, soft predictions) are especially useful in
the case of ranking problems like movie or product recommendation [TJB09], and advertisement
ranking [MHS+13]. One can view the soft-labels as estimates for the conditional probability of
the underlying true hard label given a feature vector x ∈ X . One immediate approach for the
soft-label case is to discretize the interval [0, 1] and use the same framework for the binary (or the
multi-label) classification. Since our accuracy guarantees do not explicitly depend on the number
of classes (in multi-label classification), therefore we can have arbitrary fine-grained discretization,
as long as there is sufficient agreement (up to the discretization width) among the collection of
classifiers produced by the underlying (non-private) learner. We show that if such learner satisfies
a notion of on-average stability (weaker than the standard notion of uniform stability), then one can
show that the soft predictions of those classifiers will also have sufficient concentration, up to the
discretization width. We show this via a novel argument that uses an Efron-Stein style inequality
[Ste86].
We also show that standard algorithms like stochastic gradient descent (SGD) satisfy such
notion of stability. A technical issue that arises with this discretization approach is that, although
we can show that the ensemble predictions are concentrated within a small region, we do not know
where exactly does that region lie. We address this by designing the algorithm such that there is
no cost of privacy (in terms of the privacy parameter ǫ) for those feature vectors (queries) whose
concentration occurs close to zero, or close to one. Intuitively, this means that for feature vectors
on which the underlying learner has relatively high confidence about the nature of the underlying
hard label, there is no cost of privacy. If the concentration is not close to either zero or one, then
we use the shifted discretization trick from [DL09] to answer those queries, but do pay a price
of privacy in this case. Moreover, we prove a lemma which shows that our private algorithm
amplifies the confidence of the underlying non-private learner. Our main theorem in this section
can be informally stated as follows.
Informal Theorem 1.2 (Corresponding to Theorem 5.14). Let m be the number of soft-label
queries. Let T ∈ [m], ν ∈ [0, 1/2]. Suppose that the underlying (non-private) learner is α-on
average stable (in the sense of Definition 5.7) with respect to input dataset of n′ i.i.d. examples.
Suppose that the number of feature vectors (queries) for which the expected value of the soft pre-
diction generated via that learner is ∈ (ν, 1− ν) does not exceed T . Then, given an input dataset
of size n ≈ n′√T /ǫ (ignoring log factors inm, 1/δ), with high probability, our private algorithm
(Algorithm 6) answers allm queries with soft predictions that are within ≈ ν/2 + α√n′ from the
expected value of the prediction of the non-private learner.
When the expected value of the soft prediction generated via a learner on feature vector x
is either ≤ ν or ≥ 1 − ν, we say that learner has ν-quality on x. The above theorem provides
non-trivial guarantees when (i) the underlying non-private learner is o(1/
√
n′)-on average stable
5
(where n′ is the size of its input sample), and (ii) the number of queried feature vectors for which
the learner has ν-quality is ≥ m − T where T ≪ m. In particular, when these two conditions
are satisfied, then with only an extra factor of ≈ √T/ǫ in the size of the input sample, with high
probability our private algorithm yields soft predictions that are almost as accurate as the expected
predictions of the non-private learner.
For the first condition, we note that popular algorithms such as SGD satisfy this condition under
standard assumptions on the loss function used in training (e.g., see [HRS15, Theorem 3.9]). The
second condition is typically satisfied in scenarios with relatively low label noise. To elaborate, let
p(y|x), y ∈ {0, 1} denote the true conditional probabilities of the hard label given a queried feature
x. Since a soft-label generated by a learner for a feature vector x can be viewed as an estimate for
p(1|x), in scenarios where |p(0|x)−p(1|x)| is relatively large with high probability over the choice
of x (i.e., when the Bayes risk is small), a learner that generates sufficiently accurate soft-labels
(i.e., good estimates for p(1|x)) will satisfy the above notion of quality with small ν for all except
a small fraction of the queried feature vectors. Hence, in such settings, our second condition will
be satisfied with T ≪ m. (For more details, see discussion after Definition 5.11 in Section 5.)
Revisiting the stability of SGD. We provide a result showing that SGD satisfies our notion of
on-average stability mentioned above. The work by [HRS15] shows that randomized SGD (par-
ticularly via randomly permuting the data, or sampling with replacement) satisfies uniform stabil-
ity, which is stronger than our notion of on-average stability. On the other hand, our result for
on-average stability of SGD holds even when running SGD does not involve randomization via
permutation or sampling, and hence does not follow directly from the results of [HRS15]. For
example, it applies even to the (deterministic) one-pass version of SGD. Our proof is based on a
reduction from on-average stability of any standard SGD method to uniform stability of SGD that
uses a random permutation. We think the proof technique could be of independent interest. The
result is based on a very simple argument that involves manipulating random variables and their
expectations, and uses simple properties of i.i.d. sequences.
1.2 Comparison with Relevant Prior Work
Sparse-vector based constructions: [HR10, GRU12] showed that it is possible to answer m
linear queries accurately on a dataset with the privacy cost having a dependence logarithmically
in m. They obtained the guarantees by using a variant of the sparse vector technique [DRV10,
DR+14]. The guarantees we provide are incomparable to these results as the query classes under
consideration are different.
Stability and Sample-and-aggregate based constructions: [ST13] introduced the distance to
instability framework, and combined it with the sub-sample and aggregate framework [NRS07] to
provide the first non-trivial error bounds for high-dimensional LASSO estimators. We extend their
framework, combining it with the sparse vector technique to answer a large number of classification
queries while incurring a privacy cost only for the “unstable” queries among them.
Application in knowledge transfer in deep learning: [PAE+17, PSM+18] use a similar idea of
sub-sample and aggregate to train deep learning models. Our work differs from these works in a
couple of aspects: i) the aggregation scheme used in [PAE+17] is a variant of the exponential mech-
6
anism [MT07], the one used in [PSM+18] is a combination of the Report Noisy Max algorithm
[DR+14] and the sparse vector technique, whereas we use the distance to instability framework
of [ST13] combined with sparse vector; ii) both the prior works do not provide any formal utility
guarantees, whereas we give provable accuracy guarantees for our algorithm. [PSM+18] empiri-
cally observe that if there is agreement among the ensemble of classifiers for a given classification
query, then the cost of privacy for that query is very low. Furthermore, they use the sparse vector
technique to exploit this observation to answer a large number of queries while keeping the overall
privacy budget small. We (independently) make a similar observation analytically, and formally
quantify the overall “privacy cost”. Additionally, the techniques from both the prior works ap-
ply only for classification queries, whereas our framework incorporates soft-label classification as
well.
Label-private learning: [CH11] gave upper and lower bounds on the sample complexity label-
private learning in terms of the doubling dimension. The work of [BNS16] showed that the sample
complexity can be characterized in terms of the VC dimension. Both works have considered only
pure differentially private learners, and their constructions are computationally inefficient. Also,
[BNS16] considered only the realizable case, where they gave an upper bound on the sample
complexity, which is only a factor of O(1/α) worse than the optimal non-private bound for the re-
alizable case. Comparing to [BNS16], our work gives a computationally efficient construction of a
label-private PAC learner with sample complexity upper bound that is only a factor of O˜
(√
V/α
)
worse than the optimal non-private bound. On the other hand, our construction satisfies approxi-
mate rather than pure differential privacy. Moreover, we prove a sample complexity upper bound
for the agnostic (non-realizable) case. Our bound in the agnostic case exhibits the same connection
to the optimal non-private sample complexity, (i.e., only a factor of O˜
(√
V/α
)
larger), however,
the accuracy of the final output classifier in this case may have a suboptimal dependency (by a
small constant factor) on γ , min
h∈H
err(h;D) (the best possible accuracy achieved for the given
concept classH).
2 Background and Preliminaries
In this section, we formally define the notation, important definitions, and the existing results used
in this work.
We denote the data universe by U , and an n-element dataset by D = {z1, z2, . . . , zn}. For
any two datasets D,D′ ∈ U∗, we denote the symmetric difference between them by D∆D′. For
classification tasks, we use X to denote the space of feature vectors, and Y to denote the set of
labels. Thus, U = X ×Y in this case, and each data element is denoted as (x, y). First, we provide
a definition of PAC learning (used in Section 4.1).
Definition 2.1 (Agnostic Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learner ([KV94])). Let D be a
distribution defined over the space of feature vectors and labels U = X ×Y . LetH be a hypothesis
class with each h ∈ H is a mapping h : X → Y . We say an algorithmΘ : U∗ →H is an Agnostic
PAC learner forH if it satisfies the following condition: For every α, β ∈ (0, 1), there is a number
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n = n(α, β) ∈ N such that when Θ is run on a dataset D of n i.i.d. examples from D, then with
probability 1− β (over the randomness ofD) it outputs a hypothesis hD with err(hD;D) ≤ γ+α,
where err(h;D) , P
(x,y)∼D
[hD(x) 6= y] and γ , min
h∈H
err(h;D).
We will also use the following parametrized version of the above definition.
Definition 2.2 ((α, β, n)-learner for a class H). Let α, β ∈ (0, 1) and n ∈ N. An algorithm
Θ is (α, β, n)-(agnostic) PAC learner if, given an input dataset D of n i.i.d. examples from
the underlying unknown distribution D, with probability 1 − β, it outputs a hypothesis hD with
err(hD;D) ≤ γ + α (where γ is defined as in Definition 2.1 above).
Next, we define the notion of differential privacy, state some of its properties, and describe
some of the mechanisms and frameworks for achieving differential privacy that we use in this
work. We start by providing the definition of approximate differential privacy.
Definition 2.3 ((ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy ([DKM+06, DMNS06])). A (randomized) algorithmM
with input domain U∗ and output rangeR is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for all pairs of datasets
D,D′ ∈ U∗ s.t. |D∆D′| = 1, and every measurable S ⊆ R, we have with probability at least
1− δ over the coin flips ofM that:
Pr (M(D) ∈ S) ≤ eǫ · Pr (M(D′) ∈ S) .
When δ = 0, it is known as pure differential privacy, and parameterized only by ǫ in this case.
An important advantage of differential privacy is that it is closed under post-processing, which
we describe next.
Lemma 2.4 (Post-processing ([DMNS06])). If a mechanism M : U∗ → Y is (ǫ, δ)-differentially
private, then for any function f : Y → Y ′, we have that f ◦M is also (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
One of the most common techniques for achieving pure differential privacy is the Laplace
mechanism, for which we first define the global sensitivity of a function.
Definition 2.5 (Global sensitivity). A function f : U∗ → R has global sensitivity γ if
max
D,D′∈U∗:
|D∆D′|=1
‖f(D)− f(D′)‖1 = γ.
Lemma 2.6 (Laplace mechanism ([DMNS06])). If a function f : Un → Rp has global sensitivity
γ, then the mechanism M , which on input D ∈ Un outputs f(D) + b, where b ∼ Lap (γ
ǫ
)p
,
satisfies ǫ-differential privacy. Here, Lap(λ)p denotes a vector of p i.i.d. samples from the Laplace
distribution Lap(λ).
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Algorithm 1 AsparseVec: Sparse vector technique
Input: dataset: D, query set Q = {q1, · · · , qm}, privacy parameters ǫ, δ > 0, unstable query
cutoff: T , threshold: w
1: c← 0, λ←√32T log(1/δ)/ǫ, and ŵ ← w + Lap(λ)
2: for q ∈ Q and c ≤ T do
3: q̂ ← q + Lap(2λ)
4: If q̂ > ŵ, then , output ⊤, else output ⊥, and set ŵ ← w + Lap(λ), c← c+ 1
2.1 The Sparse Vector Technique
Here, we describe the Sparse vector technique, and provide the privacy and utility guarantees for
it. Sparse vector allows answering a set of queries in an online setting, where a cost for privacy is
incurred only if the answer to a query falls near or below a predetermined threshold. We denote the
set of queries by Q = {q1, · · · , qm}, where every qi : U∗ → R, and has global sensitivity at most
one. We provide a pseudocode for the technique in Algorithm 1. Next, we provide the privacy and
accuracy guarantees for Algorithm 1.
Theorem 2.7 (Privacy guarantee ([DRV10, HR10, DR+14])). Algorithm 1 is (ǫ, δ)-differentially
private.
Theorem 2.8 (Accuracy guarantee ([DRV10, HR10, DR+14])). Forα = log(2mT/β)
√
512T log(1/δ)/ǫ,
and any set of m queries q1, · · · , qm, define the set L(α) = {i : qi(D) ≤ w + α}. If |L(α)| ≤ T ,
then we have the following w.p. at least 1− β: ∀i 6∈ L(α) Algorithm 1 outputs ⊤.
3 Privately Answering Stable Online Queries
In this section, we design a generic framework that allows answering a set of queries on a dataset
while preserving differential privacy, and only incurs a privacy cost for the queries that are unstable.
3.1 Distance to Instability Framework
First, we describe the distance to instability framework from [ST13] that releases the exact value
of a function on a dataset while preserving differential privacy, provided the function is sufficiently
stable on the dataset. We define the notion of stability first, and provide the pseudocode for a
private estimator for any function via this framework in Algorithm 2.
Definition 3.1 (k-stability [ST13]). A function f : U∗ → R is k-stable on dataset D if adding or
removing any k elements from D does not change the value of f , that is, f(D) = f(D′) for all
D′ such that |D△D′| ≤ k. We say f is stable on D if it is (at least) 1-stable on D, and unstable
otherwise.
The distance to instability of a dataset D ∈ U∗ with respect to a function f is the number of
elements that must be added to or removed from D to reach a dataset that is not stable. Note that
D is k-stable if and only if its distance to instability is at least k.
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Theorem 3.2 (Privacy guarantee for Astab). If the threshold Γ = log(1/δ)/ǫ, and the distance to
instability function distf(D) = argmax
k
[f(D) is k-stable], then Algorithm 2 is (ǫ, δ)-differentially
private.
Proof. We prove the above theorem by considering the two possibilities for anyD′ s.t. |D∆D′| =
1: either f(D) = f(D′), or f(D) 6= f(D′). We prove the privacy in these two cases via Lemmas
3.3 and 3.4.
Lemma 3.3. LetD ∈ U∗ be any fixed dataset. Assume that for any datasetD′ ∈ U∗ s.t. |D∆D′| =
1, we have f(D) = f(D′). Then, for any output s ∈ R ∪ {⊥}, we have: Pr[Astab(D, f) = s] ≤
eǫ Pr[Astab(D′, f) = s].
Proof. First, note that with the instantiation in Theorem 3.2, the function distf has a global sensi-
tivity of one. Therefore, by the guarantees of the Laplace mechanism (Lemma 2.6), d̂ist satisfies
ǫ-differential privacy. Since the set of possible outputs is the same (i.e., {f(D),⊥}) for both D
and D′, and the decision to output f(D) versus ⊥ depends only on d̂ist , we get the statement of
the lemma by the post-processing property of differential privacy (Lemma 2.4).
Lemma 3.4. LetD ∈ U∗ be any fixed dataset. Assume that for any datasetD′ ∈ U∗ s.t. |D∆D′| =
1, we have f(D) 6= (D′). Then, for any output s ∈ R∪{⊥}, we have the following with probability
at least 1− δ: Astab(D, f) = Astab(D′, f) = ⊥.
Proof. Since f(D) 6= f(D′), it follows that f(D) and f(D′) are unstable, i.e., distf (D) =
distf(D
′) = 0. This implies
Pr[Astab(D, f) = ⊥] = Pr[Astab(D′, f) = ⊥] = Pr
[
Lap
(
1
ǫ
)
≤ log(1/δ)
ǫ
]
.
Since the density function for the Laplace distribution Lap(λ) is µ(x) = 1
2λ
e−|x|/λ, it follows that
Pr
[
Lap
(
1
ǫ
) ≤ log(1/δ)
ǫ
]
≥ 1− δ.
We get the statement of Theorem 3.2 by combining Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4.
Theorem 3.5 (Utility guarantee for Astab ([ST13])). If the threshold Γ = log(1/δ)/ǫ, the distance
to instability function is chosen as in Theorem 3.2, and f(D) is ((log(1/δ) + log(1/β)) /ǫ)-stable,
then Algorithm 2 outputs f(D) with probability at least 1− β.
Algorithm 2 Astab [ST13]: Private estimator for f via distance to instability
Input: dataset: D, function f : U∗ → R, distance to instability distf : U∗ → R, threshold: Γ,
privacy parameter ǫ > 0
1: d̂ist ← distf (D) + Lap (1/ǫ)
2: If d̂ist > Γ, then output f(D), else output ⊥
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Algorithm 3 AOQR: Online Query Release via distance to instability
Input: dataset: D, query set F = {f1, · · · , fm} chosen online, distance to instability distfi :
U∗ → R, ∀i ∈ [m], unstable query cutoff: T , privacy parameters ǫ, δ > 0
1: c← 0, λ←√32T log(2/δ)/ǫ, w ← 2λ · log(2m/δ), and ŵ ← w + Lap(λ).
2: for f ∈ F and c ≤ T do
3: out← Astab (D, f, distf ,Γ = ŵ, ǫ = 1/2λ)
4: If out = ⊥, then c← c+ 1 and ŵ ← w + Lap(λ)
5: Output out
3.2 Online Query Release via Distance to Instability Framework
Using Algorithm AOQR (Algorithm 3), we show that for a set of m queries F = {f1, · · · , fm} to
be answered on a dataset D, one can exactly answer all but T of them while satisfying differential
privacy, as long as at most T queries in F are not α-stable, where α ≈ log(m)√T/ǫ. Notice that
the dependence of α on the total number of queries (m) is logarithmic. In contrast, one would
achieve a dependence of roughly
√
m by using the advanced composition property of differential
privacy [DRV10].
The main design focus in this section is that the algorithms should be able to handle very
generic query classes F under minimal assumptions. A salient feature of Algorithm AOQR is that
it only requires the range Ri of the function fi : U∗ → Ri, where fi ∈ F , to be discrete for all
i ∈ [m].
We provide the privacy and utility guarantees for Algorithm 3 in Theorem 3.6 and Corol-
lary 3.9, respectively. Surprisingly, the utility guarantee of AOQR has no dependence on the cardi-
nality of the setRi, for all i ∈ [m].
Theorem 3.6 (Privacy guarantee for AOQR). If for all functions f ∈ F , the distance to instability
function is distf (D) = argmax
k
[f(D) is k-stable], then Algorithm 3 is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. In our proof, we use ideas from the proof of Theorem 3.2 and the sparse vector technique
(See Section 2 for a background on the technique). For clarity, we split the computation in Al-
gorithm 3 into two logical phases: First, for every query f ∈ F , AOQR either commits to ⊤, or
outputs ⊥ based on the input dataset D. Next, if it commits to ⊤, then it outputs f(D).
Now, let us consider two fictitious algorithms A1 and A2, where A1 outputs the sequence of
⊤ and ⊥ corresponding to the first phase above, and A2 is invoked to output fi(D) only for the
queries fi that A1 output ⊤. Notice that the combination of A1 and A2 is equivalent to AOQR.
Since A1 is essentially executing the sparse vector technique (Algorithm 1), by Theorem 2.7, it
satisfies (ǫ, δ/2)-differential privacy. Next, we analyze the privacy for AlgorithmA2.
Consider any particular query f ∈ F . For any dataset D′ s.t. |D∆D′| = 1, there are two
possibilities: either f(D) = f(D′), or f(D) 6= f(D′). When f(D) = f(D′), if A1 outputs
⊥, algorithm A2 is not invoked and hence the privacy guarantee isn’t affected. Moreover,if A1
outputs ⊤, we get the following lemma by the post-processing property of differential privacy
(Lemma 2.4):
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Lemma 3.7. LetD ∈ U∗ be any fixed dataset. Assume that for any datasetD′ ∈ U∗ s.t. |D∆D′| =
1, we have f(D) = f(D′). Then, for any output s ∈ R, we have the following for the invocation
of AlgorithmA2: Pr[A2(D, f) = s] = Pr[A2(D′, f) = s].
When f(D) 6= f(D′), by Lemma 3.4, A1 outputs ⊥ with probability at least 1 − δ/2m.
Therefore, we get that:
Lemma 3.8. LetD ∈ U∗ be any fixed dataset. Assume that for any datasetD′ ∈ U∗ s.t. |D∆D′| =
1, we have f(D) 6= f(D′). Then, Algorithm A2 is never invoked to output f(D) with probability
at least 1− δ/2m.
Now, consider the sequence of queries f1, · · · , fm. LetF1 be the set of queries where, for every
f ∈ F1, we have f(D) = f(D′). Let F2 = F\F1. Since Algorithm A1 is (ǫ, δ/2)-differentially
private for all queries in F , it is also (ǫ, δ/2)-differentially private for all queries in F1. Now since
|F2| ≤ m, using Lemma 3.8 and taking an union bound over all the queries in |F2|, Algorithm
A2 is never invoked for queries in F2 with probability at least 1 − δ/2. By general composition
[DR+14], this implies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy for the overall algorithmAOQR.
Corollary 3.9 (Utility guarantee for AOQR). For any set of m adaptively chosen queries F =
{f1, · · · , fm}, let distfi(D) = argmax
k
[fi(D) is k-stable] for each fi. Also, define L(α) =
{i : dist fi(D) < α} for α = 32 · log (4mT/min (δ, β))
√
2T log(2/δ)/ǫ . If |L(α)| ≤ T , then
we have the following w.p. at least 1 − β: ∀i 6∈ L(α), Algorithm AOQR (Algorithm 3) outputs
fi(D).
Proof. The proof follows directly from Theorem 2.8. To see this, note that Algorithm AOQR fol-
lows the same lines of Algorithm AsparseVec with slight adjustments. In particular, ⊤ in AsparseVec
is replaced with f(D) in AOQR; δ in the setting of λ in AsparseVec is replaced with δ/2 in the set-
ting of λ in AOQR; w which is left arbitrary in AsparseVec is set to 2λ log(2m/δ) in AOQR; q
in AsparseVec is replaced with distf(D) in Astab; and q̂ in AsparseVec is replaced with d̂ist in
Astab. Putting these together with Theorem 2.8 and the premise in the corollary statement (i.e.,
|{i : distfi(D) < α}| ≤ T ) immediately proves the corollary with the specified value of α. Note
that by comparing Theorem 2.8 with the premise in the corollary, we can see that the value of α
in the corollary is obtained by adding the value of w as set in AOQR and the value of α as set in
Theorem 2.8.
3.3 Instantiation: Online Query Release via the Sub-sample and Aggregate
Framework
While AlgorithmAOQR has the desired property in terms of generality, it falls short in two critical
aspects: i) it relies directly on the distance to instability framework (Algorithm Astab in Section
3.1) which does not provide an efficient way to compute the distance to instability for a given
function, and ii) given a function class F , it is unclear which functions from F satisfy the desired
property of α-stability.
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Algorithm 4 AsubSamp: Online Query Release via sub-sample and aggregate
Input: dataset: D, query set F = {f1, · · · , fm} chosen online, range of the queries:
{R1, · · · ,Rm}, unstable query cutoff: T , privacy parameters ǫ, δ > 0, failure probability:
β
1: k ← 136 · log (4mT/min (δ, β/2))√T log(2/δ)/ǫ
2: Arbitrarily split D into k non-overlapping chunks of size n/k. Call them D1, · · · , Dk
3: for i ∈ [m] do
4: Let Si = {fi(D1), · · · , fi(Dk)}, and for every r ∈ Ri, let ct(r) = # times r appears in Si
5: f̂i(D)← argmax
r∈Ri
[ct(r)], distf̂i ← max
{
0,
(
max
r∈Ri
[ct(r)]− max
r∈Ri\f̂i(D)
[ct(r)]
)
− 1
}
6: Output AOQR
(
D,
{
f̂1, · · · , f̂m
}
,
{
distf̂1 , · · · , distf̂m
}
, T, ǫ, δ
)
In Algorithm AsubSamp (Algorithm 4), we address both of these concerns by instantiating the
distance to instability function in Algorithm AOQR with the sub-sample and aggregate framework
(as done in [ST13]). We provide the privacy and accuracy guarantees for AsubSamp in Corol-
lary 3.10, and Theorem 3.11, respectively. In Section 4, we show how Algorithm AsubSamp can
be used for classification problems without relying too much on the underlying learning model
(e.g., convex versus non-convex models).
The key idea in AsubSamp is as follows: i) First, arbitrarily split the dataset D into k sub-
samples of equal size, D1, · · · , Dk, ii) For each query fi ∈ F , where i ∈ [m], and each r ∈ Ri,
compute ct(r), which is the number of sub-samples Dj , where j ∈ [k], for which fi(Dj) = r,
iii) Define f̂i(D) to be the r ∈ Ri with the largest ct, and the distance to instability function
distf̂i to correspond to the the difference between the largest ct and the second largest ct among all
r ∈ Ri, iv) Invoke AOQR with f̂i and distf̂i . Now, note that distf̂i is always efficiently computable.
Furthermore, Theorem 3.11 shows that if D is a dataset of n i.i.d. samples drawn from some
distribution D, and fi on a dataset of n/k i.i.d. samples drawn from D matches some r ∈ Ri w.p.
at least 3/4, then with high probability f̂i(D) is a stable query.
Corollary 3.10 (Privacy guarantee for AsubSamp). Algorithm 4 is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
The proof of Corollary 3.10 follows immediately from the privacy guarantee for AOQR (Algo-
rithm 3).
Theorem 3.11 (Utility guarantee for AsubSamp). Let F denote any set of m adaptively chosen
queries, and D be a dataset of n samples drawn i.i.d. from a fixed distribution D. For k =
136 · log (4mT/min (δ, β/2)) ·
√
T log(2/δ)/ǫ, let L¯ ⊆ F be a set of queries s.t. for every f ∈ L¯,
there exists some xf for which f(D̂) = xf w.p. at least 3/4 over drawing a dataset D̂ of n/k i.i.d.
data samples from D. If |L¯| ≥ m− T , then w.p. at least 1 − β over the randomness of Algorithm
AsubSamp (Algorithm 4), we have the following: ∀f ∈ L¯, Algorithm AsubSamp outputs xf . Here,
(ǫ, δ) are the privacy parameters.
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Proof. For a given query f ∈ F , let X(i)f be the random variable that equals to one if f(Di) in
AlgorithmAsubSamp equals xf , and zero otherwise. Thus, we have Pr[X(i)f = 1] ≥ 3/4 by assump-
tion. By the standard Chernoff-Hoeffding bound, we get
k∑
i=1
X
(i)
f ≥ 3k/4−
√
k log(2m/β)/2with
probability at least 1− β/2m. If k ≥ 72 log(2m/β), then the previous expression is at least 2k/3.
By the union bound, this implies that with probability at least 1 − β/2, we have distf̂ ≥ k/3 for
every f ∈ L¯. Furthermore, to satisfy the distance to instability condition in Corollary 3.9, we need
k/3 ≥ 32 · log (4mT/min (δ, β/2))√2T log(2/δ)/ǫ. Both the conditions on k are satisfied by
setting k = 136 · log (4mT/min (δ, β/2))√T log(2/δ)/ǫ. Using Corollary 3.9 along with this
value of k, we get the statement of the theorem.
4 Private Binary Classification
In this section, we consider the problem of privately answering binary classification queries (in the
standard agnostic PAC model), where for each domain point x ∈ X , a classifier h assigns a hard
label to x, i.e., h(x) ∈ {0, 1}.
In Section 4.1, we show how to use the sub-sample and aggregate framework combined with
the sparse-vector technique (Algorithm 4) to construct generic private algorithm for answering
binary classification queries on public data based on private training data.
Next, in Section 4.2, we discuss the implications of our construction on label-private learning
(and equivalently, on private semi-supervised knowledge transfer) in the standard (agnostic) PAC
model. In particular, we show that the set of labels privately generated by our algorithm in Sec-
tion 4.1 based on an input private training set, can be used to construct a new training set. The
new set can then be used to train a (non-private) learning algorithm to finally output an accurate
classifier that can be used to answer indefinite number of classification queries. The whole proce-
dure would remain (ǫ, δ) differentially private with respect to the original dataset. This is because
the second training step is a post-processing of the output labels generated by our differentially
private algorithm. We prove sample complexity upper bounds on the size of the original dataset
that would guarantee any desired accuracy and confidence for the final output classifier.
We will use X to denote an abstract data domain (e.g., the space of feature vectors). We let
Y = {0, 1}, i.e., the set of binary labels. A training set, denoted by D, is a set of n private binary-
labeled data points {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)} ⊆ X × Y drawn i.i.d. from some (arbitrary unknown)
distribution D over X × Y . Sometimes, we will refer to the induced marginal distribution over X
as DX .
4.1 Privately answering binary classification queries
In this section, we instantiate our sub-sample and aggregate framework (AsubSamp from Section 3.3)
with the binary classification setting. We set the dataset D to be n i.i.d. samples from the distri-
bution D. We also construct a set of classification queries Q = {x1, · · · , xm} ⊆ X , and let
{y1, · · · , ym} ⊆ {0, 1}m be the corresponding labels which are hidden. Corresponding to the query
14
class F = {f1, · · · , fm} in Algorithm AsubSamp, we define fi : H → {0, 1} to be fi(h) = h(xi)
for a given hypothesis h ∈ H. With a slight abuse of notation, we will refer fi(Dj) in Algorithm
AsubSamp as fi(Θ(Dj)), where Θ is an agnostic PAC learner (see Definitions 2.1 and 2.2).
Corollary 4.1. Let F and Q denote the query classes as defined above, and D be a dataset of n
i.i.d. examples from a distribution D. Let α, β ∈ (0, 1). Let γ , min
h∈H
err(h;D) (as in Definition
2.1). In Algorithm 4 (Algorithm AsubSamp), suppose we set the unstable query cutoff as T =
3
(
(γ + α)m+
√
m log(m/β)/2
)
(where k is defined in Algorithm AsubSamp). If n, α, and β are
such thatΘ is (α, β/k, n/k)-agnostic PAC learner (Definition 2.2), then i) with probability at least
1 − 2β, Algorithm AsubSamp does not halt before answering all the m queries in F , and outputs
⊥ for at most T queries in F ; and ii) the misclassification rate of Algorithm AsubSamp is at most
T/m.
Proof. First, notice that Θ is an (α, β/k, n/k)-agnostic PAC learner, hence w.p. ≥ 1 − β, the
misclassification rate of Θ(Dj) for all j ∈ [k] is at most γ + α. So, by the standard Hoeffding
bound, with probability at least 1 − β none of the Θ(Dj)’s misclassify more than (γ + α)m +√
m log(k/β)/2 < (γ + α)m+
√
m log(m/β)/2 , B queries in Q. Now, we use the following
lemma to get a bound on the number of queries for which at least k/3 sub-samples result in a
misclassification.
Lemma 4.2. Consider a set of {(x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym)} ⊂ X × Y , and k binary classifiers
h1, . . . , hk, where each classifier is guaranteed to make at most B mistakes in predicting the m
labels {y1, . . . , ym}. Then, for any ξ ∈ (0, 1/2],∣∣∣∣{i ∈ [m] : |{j ∈ [k] : hj(xi) 6= yi}| > ξk}∣∣∣∣ < B/ξ
Therefore, by the counting argument from Lemma 4.2, there are at most 3B queries f ∈ F such
that the set S = {f(Θ(D1)), · · · , f(Θ(Dk))} has number of ones (or, zeros) that is > k/3. Now,
part 1 of the corollary follows by the same proof technique that has been used to prove Theorem
3.11. Moreover, by the same lemma, w.p. 1−β, in each of the remainingm−3B queries, there are
at least 2k/3 classifiers that output the correct label. Hence, again by the same proof technique of
Theorem 3.11, w.p. ≥ 1− 2β our instantiation of Algorithm 4 will correctly classify such queries.
Hence, w.p. ≥ 1− 2β, the misclassification rate is 3B/m = T/m. This completes the proof.
Remark 1. We can obtain similar guarantees for multi-class classification with an almost identical
proof as of Corollary 4.1. We provide the guarantees for binary classification in Corollary 4.1 for
simplicity.
Explicit misclassification rate: For VC classes, we now show how to obtain explicit misclas-
sification rates for our algorithm in terms of the VC-dimension of the hypothesis class. Let V
denote the VC-dimension of the hypothesis class H. Then by standard uniform convergence ar-
guments ([SSBD14]), one can show that there exists an (α, β, n/k)-agnostic PAC learner with
α = O˜
(√
kV /n
)
, and hence it has a misclassification rate of ≈ γ + O˜
(√
kV /n
)
when trained
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on a dataset of size n/k. Assuming m = Ω˜(1/α2), the setting of T in Corollary 4.1 becomes
T = O(m(α + γ)). Hence, setting k as in Algorithm 4 implies that k ≈ O˜ (m2/3 V 1/3/n1/3). To
see this, note that T depends on α which itself depends on k, and also note that k depends on T .
Hence, by putting these together and solving for k, we reach the above expression of k. Therefore,
Corollary 4.1 implies that our algorithm yields a misclassification rate of≈ γ+O˜ (m1/3V 2/3/n2/3)
(where m = Ω˜ (1/α2) = Ω˜
(
(n/V )4/5
)
). This implies that we can answer up to Ω˜
(
(n/V )4/5
)
queries with misclassification rate O˜
(
V 2/5/n2/5
)
, which is only a factor of ≈ (n/V )1/10 worse
than the optimal non-private misclassification rate.
In the realizable case when γ = 0, the misclassification rate of the PAC learner is α = O˜ (kV /n).
Assumingm = Ω˜(1/α2), then the setting of T in Corollary 4.1 becomes T = O(mα). In this case,
setting k as in Algorithm 4 implies that k ≈ O˜ (mV/n). Hence, Corollary 4.1 implies that our al-
gorithm yields a misclassification rate of≈ O˜ (mV 2/n2) (wherem = Ω˜ (1/α2) = Ω˜
(
(n/V )4/3
)
).
Again, this implies that in the realizable setting, we can answer up to Ω˜
(
(n/V )4/3
)
queries with
with misclassification rate O˜
(
V 2/3/n2/3
)
, which is a factor of ≈ (n/V )1/3 worse than the optimal
non-private misclassification rate.
We formally state these conclusions in the following theorems.
Theorem 4.3 (Private classification queries in the PAC setting). Consider a hypothesis class
H of VC-dimension V . Consider the realizable setting where an unknown labeling function in
H generates the labels. Let α, β ∈ (0, 1). Let n be the size of the private training set, and
m ≥ 4 log (1/αβ) /α2 be the maximum number of binary classification queries (public feature
vectors) allowed2. In the above instantiation of Algorithm 4, set T = 3
(
αm+
√
m log(m/β)/2
)
and k as in Algorithm 4 (i.e., k = 136 log (4mT/min (δ, β))
√
T log(2/δ)/ǫ). If
n = O
(
(V log(1/α) + log(m/β)) log (mT/min (δ, β))
√
T log(1/δ)/ǫ
α
)
= O˜
(
V
√
m/α
)
,
then w.p. ≥ 1− β, the instantiation of Algorithm 4 classifies at leastm− T queries correctly.
Theorem 4.4 (Private classification queries in the agnostic PAC setting). Consider a hypothe-
sis class H of VC-dimension V . Let γ = min
h∈H
err(h;D) (as in Definition 2.1). Let α, β ∈
(0, 1). Let n be the size of the private training set, and m ≥ 4 log (1/αβ) /α2 be the maximum
number of binary classification queries allowed. In the above instantiation of Algorithm 4, set
T = 3
(
(α + γ)m+
√
m log(m/β)/2
)
and k as in Algorithm 4. If
n = O
(
(V + log(m/β)) log (mT/min (δ, β))
√
T log(1/δ)/ǫ
α2
)
= O˜
(
V
√
m/α3/2
)
,
then w.p. ≥ 1− β, the instantiation of Algorithm 4 classifies at leastm− T queries correctly.
2Note thatm only represents an upper on the number of queries our algorithm can answer. The number of queries
actually submitted can be less thanm.
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4.2 Sample complexity bounds for efficient label-private learning
In this section, we build on our results above to achieve a stronger objective than merely answering
classification queries. In particular, we show how to bootstrap from our construction above and
produce a private learner that publishes an accurate privatized classifier, which can then be used to
label as many feature vectors as we desire. The idea is fairly simple: we use our private construc-
tion above to generate labels on a sufficiently large set of unlabeled domain points. Then, we use
the resulting labeled set as a new training set for any standard (non-private) learner, which in turn
outputs an accurate private classifier.
Our final construction can be viewed as a private learner in either of the following situations:
(i) the setting where the original training set is private but we still have access to public unlabeled
data, or (ii) the setting where only the labels of the training set are considered private and we do
not have access to public unlabeled data. Note that the second setting can be reduced to the first by
splitting the training set into two parts, and throwing away the labels of one of them. We formalize
our idea below, and prove explicit sample complexity bounds for the final private learner in both
PAC and agnostic PAC settings.
Let hj = Θ(Dj), j ∈ [k] be the k classifiers generated by the non-private learner in our
instantiation of Algorithm 4 described in Section 4.1. For a target accuracy and confidence param-
eters α, β ∈ (0, 1), we will always assume that Θ is (α, β/k, n/k)-(agnostic) PAC learner for the
hypothesis classH (for appropriately chosen n).
Let hpriv denote the mapping defined by our instantiation of Algorithm 4 on a single input
feature vector (query). That is, for x ∈ X , hpriv(x) ∈ {0, 1,⊥} denotes the output of our algorithm
on a single input query x. Note that without loss of generality, we can view hpriv as a binary
classifier. In particular, as far as our accuracy guarantees are concerned, we may replace an output
⊥ with a uniformly random label in {0, 1}. Our private learner is described in Algorithm 5 below.
Algorithm 5 APriv: Private Learner
Input: Unlabeled set of m i.i.d. feature vectors: S = {x1, . . . , xm}, oracle access to our private
classifier hpriv, oracle access to (agnostic) PAC learner Θ.
1: for t = 1, . . . , m do
2: yˆt ← hpriv(xt)
3: Let D˜ = {(x1, yˆ1), . . . , (xm, yˆm)}.
4: Output hˆ← Θ(D˜).
We assume that hpriv represents one invocation of our instantiation of Algorithm 4 with number
of queries set tom (the size of S) and cutoff parameter T set as in Corollary 4.1.
Note thatAPriv is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private since it is a postprocessing of the labels yˆ1, . . . , yˆm
generated by our private (ǫ, δ) differentially private algorithm described in Section 4.1. We also
note thatAPriv is computationally efficient as long as the underlying non-private learner Θ is com-
putationally efficient.
Note that the mapping hpriv is independent of the input feature vector (query) x ∈ X ; it only
depends on the input training set (in particular, on h1, . . . , hk) and on the internal randomness (due
to noise in in the threshold ŵ and the distance d̂ist ).
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We now make the following claim about hpriv. In this claim,m and k refer to the parameters in
the instantiation of Algorithm 4.
Claim 4.5. Let 0 < β ≤ α < 1. Let m ≥ 4 log(1/αβ)/α2. Suppose that Θ is (α, β/k, n/k)-
(agnostic) PAC learner for the hypothesis class H. Then, with probability at least 1 − 2β (over
the randomness of the input training set D and the internal randomness in Algorithm 4), we have
err(hpriv;D) ≤ 3γ + 7α = O(γ + α), where γ = min
h∈H
err(h;D).
Proof. The proof largely relies on the proof of Corollary 4.1. First, note that w.p. ≥ 1 − β (over
the randomness of the input datasetD) for all j ∈ [k], err(hj ;D) ≤ α. We will thereafter condition
on this event.
Let x1, . . . , xm be a sequence of i.i.d. feature vectors, and y1, . . . , ym be the corresponding
(unknown) labels. Now, for every t ∈ [m], define
vt , 1 (|{j ∈ [k] : hj(xt) 6= yt}| > k/3)
Note that since (x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym) are i.i.d., it follows that v1, . . . , vm are i.i.d. (note that this
is true since we conditioned on the dataset D). Note that in the proof of Corollary 4.1, we showed
that
P
x1,...,xm
[
1
m
m∑
t=1
vt > 3
(
α + γ +
√
log(m/β)
2m
)]
< β
Hence, for any t ∈ [m],
E
x1,...,xm
[vt] = E
x1,...,xm
[
1
m
m∑
t=1
vt
]
< β + 3
(
α+ γ +
√
log(m/β)
2m
)
≤ 7α + 3γ
where the first equality follows from the fact that v1, . . . , vm are i.i.d., and the last inequality follows
from the assumptions that β ≤ α and thatm ≥ 4 log(1/αβ)/α2.
For every t ∈ [m], let v¯t = 1 − vt, i.e., the negation of vt. As in the proof of Corollary 4.1, by
invoking the same technique used before in the proof of Theorem 3.11, then we can show that w.p.
at least 1− β over the internal randomness (noise) in Algorithm 4, for all t ∈ [m], we have
v¯t = 1⇒ hpriv(xt) = yt
Hence, conditioned on this event (over the internal randomness of Algorithm 4), for any t ∈ [m],
we have
P
xt
[hpriv(xt) 6= yt] ≤ P
xt
[vt = 1] = E
xt
[vt] ≤ 7α + 3γ.
Hence, putting all together, w.p. ≥ 1− 2β, err(hpriv;D) ≤ 7α+ 3γ.
We are now ready to state and prove the main statements of this section.
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Theorem 4.6 (Sample complexity bound for Efficient Label-Private PAC Learning). Let H be a
hypothesis class of VC-dimension V . Assume realizability holds, i.e., there is an unknown labeling
function inH generates the true labels. Let 0 < β ≤ α < 1. Letm be the number of i.i.d. examples
such that Θ is (α, β,m)-agnostic PAC learner of H, namely, let m = O
(
V+log(1/β)
α2
)
. Let the
parameters T and k of the instantiation of Algorithm 4 (in Section 4.1) be set as in Theorem 4.3
(with m set as above). If the size of the input private dataset n is as in Theorem 4.3, that is,
n = O˜
(
V 3/2/α3/2
)
, then, w.p. ≥ 1− 3β, the output hypothesis hˆ of APriv (Algorithm 5) satisfies
err(hˆ;D) = O(α).
Proof. Let h∗ ∈ H denote the true labeling hypothesis. We will denote the true distributionD over
X×Y as (DX , h∗), whereDX denotes the marginal distribution overX induced byD. The notation
(DX , h∗) refers to the fact that the feature vectors are drawn fromDX , and the corresponding labels
are generated by applying h∗ to the feature vectors.
For the remainder of the proof, we condition on the event in the statement of Claim 4.5,
i.e., we condition on the input dataset D and the internal randomness of Algorithm 4 such that
err(hpriv;D) ≤ 3γ+7α. Note such event occurs w.p. ≥ 1− 2β over the datasetD and the internal
randomness of Algorithm 4.
Let D˜ = {(x1, yˆ1), . . . , (xm, yˆm)} be the new training set generated by APriv (Algorithm 5),
where m is set as in the theorem statement. Using the same style of notation as above, note that
each (xt, yˆt), t ∈ [m], is drawn independently from (DX , hpriv). Now, sinceΘ is (α, β,m)-agnostic
PAC learner forH, w.p. ≥ 1− β (over D˜), the output hypothesis hˆ satisfies
err(hˆ; (DX , hpriv))− err(h∗; (DX , hpriv)) ≤ err(hˆ; (DX , hpriv))−min
h∈H
err(h; (DX , hpriv)) ≤ α
Observe that
err(h∗; (DX , hpriv)) = E
x∼DX
[1 (h∗(x) 6= hpriv(x))] = err(hpriv; (DX , h∗)) = err(hpriv;D) ≤ 7α
where the last inequality follows from Claim 4.5 (where γ = 0 due to realizability). Hence, we
have err(hˆ; (DX , hpriv)) ≤ 8α. Furthermore, observe
err(hˆ;D) = E
x∼DX
[
1(hˆ(x) 6= h∗(x))
]
≤ E
x∼DX
[
1(hˆ(x) 6= hpriv(x)) + 1(hpriv(x) 6= h∗(x))
]
= err(hˆ; (DX , hpriv)) + err(hpriv;D)
≤ 15α
Hence, we conclude that w.p. ≥ 1 − 3β (over the private dataset D, the internal randomness of
Algorithm 4, and the set of public feature vectors S), we have err(hˆ;D) ≤ 15α.
Theorem 4.7 (Sample complexity bound for Efficient Label-Private Agnostic PAC Learning). Let
H be a hypothesis class of VC-dimension V . Let 0 < β ≤ α < 1. Letm = O
(
V+log(1/β)
α2
)
. Let the
parameters T and k of the instantiation of Algorithm 4 (in Section 4.1) be set as in Theorem 4.4
(with m set as above). If n is as in Theorem 4.4, that is, n = O˜
(
V 3/2/α5/2
)
, then, w.p. ≥
1 − 3β, the output hypothesis hˆ of APriv (Algorithm 5) satisfies err(hˆ;D) = O(α + γ) (where
γ = min
h∈H
err(h;D)).
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Proof. The proof follows similar lines to the proof of Theorem 4.6. First, let h˜ , argmin
h∈H
err(h;D).
Note that it follows that err(h˜;D) = γ. As in the proof of Theorem 4.6, we start by conditioning
on the event in the statement of Claim 4.5.
Since Θ is (α, β,m)-agnostic PAC learner forH, w.p. ≥ 1−β (over D˜), the output hypothesis
hˆ satisfies
err(hˆ; (DX , hpriv))− err(h˜; (DX , hpriv)) ≤ err(hˆ; (DX , hpriv))−min
h∈H
err(h; (DX , hpriv)) ≤ α
Next, note that
err(h˜; (DX , hpriv)) = E
x∼DX
[
1
(
h˜(x) 6= hpriv(x)
)]
≤ E
(x,y)∼D
[
1
(
h˜(x) 6= y
)
+ 1 (hpriv(x) 6= y)
]
≤ err(h˜;D) + err(hpriv;D)
≤ 4γ + 7α
where the last inequality follows from the definition of h˜ and from Claim 4.5. Hence, we have
err(hˆ; (DX , hpriv)) ≤ 4γ + 8α. Moreover, observe that
err(hˆ;D) = E
(x,y)∼D
[
1(hˆ(x) 6= y
]
≤ E
(x,y)∼D
[
1(hˆ(x) 6= hpriv(x)) + 1(hpriv(x) 6= y)
]
= err(hˆ; (DX , hpriv)) + err(hpriv;D)
≤ 7γ + 15α
Hence, we conclude that w.p. ≥ 1 − 3β (over the private dataset D, the internal randomness of
Algorithm 4, and the set of public feature vectors S), we have err(hˆ;D) ≤ 7γ + 15α.
Implications and comparison to prior work on label privacy: Our results above have impor-
tant implications on private learning in a setting where the learner is required to only protect the
privacy of the labels, or in a setting where the learner is required to preserve the privacy of the
entire sample but it has access to public unlabeled data from the same distribution. In both of these
settings, the above theorems show that we can privately and efficiently learn any given concept
class. In particular, Theorem 4.6 shows that in the realizable case our efficient construction APriv
is of a label-private PAC learner, and gives a sample complexity upper bound that is only a factor
of O˜
(√
V/α
)
worse than the optimal non-private sample complexity. Theorem 4.7 gives anal-
ogous guarantees in the agnostic (non-realizable) case; our sample complexity upper bound for
the agnostic case is also only a factor of O˜
(√
V/α
)
larger than the optimal non-private sample
complexity. However, we note that the accuracy of the final output classifier in the agnostic case
may have a suboptimal dependency (by a small constant factor) on γ , min
h∈H
err(h;D).
Label-private learning has been considered before in [CH11] and [BNS16]. Both works have only
considered pure, i.e., (ǫ, 0), differentially private learners for those settings, and the constructions in
both works are computationally inefficient. In particular, the work of [CH11] gave upper and lower
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bounds on the sample complexity in terms of the doubling dimension. Their upper boundwas given
via an inefficient construction, and it also involves a smoothness condition on the distribution of
the features DX . The work of [BNS16] showed that the sample complexity (of pure differentially
label-private learners) can be characterized in terms of the VC dimension. They proved an upper
bound on the sample complexity via an inefficient construction, and only for the realizable case.
The bound of [BNS16] is only a factor of O(1/α) worse than the optimal non-private bound for
the realizable case. To the best of our knowledge, our constuction is the first efficient construction
with non-trivial sample complexity upper bounds for both the realizable and agnostic settings.
5 Privately Answering Soft-label classification Queries
To show the applicability of our algorithms to a broader range of problems, in this section, we will
consider a more general setting for the classification problem. Namely, we consider the soft-label
setting where the output of the learning algorithm is a mapping h that provides a soft prediction in
[0, 1] for each domain point. In particular, h(x) can be viewed as an estimate for the probability
that the true label is 1 conditioned on the feature vector being x, denoted as p(1|x).
We build on the generic algorithm of Section 3.3 (Algorithm 4) to construct a private algorithm
for answering soft-label classification queries. Our algorithm is conservative in its use of the
privacy budget, that is, the error performance (or equivalently, the sample complexity requirement)
scales only with the number of queries that are “bad” in some sense that will be precisely defined
soon.
We start by describing a generic instantiation of our private algorithm. Our algorithm only
requires a black-box access to any generic (non-private) learner that outputs a classifier based on
private training data. We provide formal utility guarantees for our algorithm, and study some
basic conditions on the underlying non-private learner under which stronger and sharper utility
guarantees can be achieved.
As before, we will use X to denote an abstract data domain (e.g., the space of feature vectors).
We let Y = {0, 1}, i.e., the set of binary labels , and Y = [0, 1], i.e., the set of soft-labels (scores,
or soft predictions). A training set, denoted by D, is a set of n private binary-labeled data points
{(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)} ⊆ X × Y drawn i.i.d. from some (arbitrary unknown) distribution D over
X × Y .
Our generic constructionASL−Quer for soft-label classification queries (Algorithm 6 below) can
be viewed as an instantiation of Algorithm 4. ASL−Quer takes as input a private training dataset D
of n i.i.d. examples, and a sequence of classification queries on public data (namely, a sequence
{x1, . . . , xm} ⊆ X of unlabeled public data). For each queried point xℓ, where ℓ ∈ [m], ASL−Quer
responds with a score (soft-label) sˆ(xℓ) ∈ Y . Before we formally describe our algorithm, we
introduce some useful definitions.
Definition 5.1 (γ-partitions of the unit interval). Let γ ∈ (0, 1/2]. A γ-partition (of subintervals)
for the unit interval is a partition Pγ =
{
Iγj : j ∈ {1, . . . , ⌈1/γ⌉}
}
, where Iγj = [(j− 1) γ, j γ)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ ⌈1/γ⌉− 1, and Iγj = [(j − 1) γ, 1] for j = ⌈1/γ⌉.
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A 1/2-shifted γ-partition P̂γ is a shifted version of Pγ , where each interval is shifted by half its
length. We assume that 1/γ is an integer, and we remove the leftmost and rightmost half-intervals
from the 1/2-shifted γ-partitions. Hence, we get equally sized bins for the histograms in both the
original and the 1/2-shifted discretizations, and the number of bins in Ĥist
γ
S is less than that of
Hist
γ
S by one. Note that this assumption is not restrictive, since for any reasonably small value
v ∈ [0, 1], one can always find a number γ such that 1/γ is an integer, and |v − γ| ≈ v2.
Definition 5.2 (γ-Histogram for a set S). Let S ⊂ [0, 1] be a finite multiset, and γ ∈ (0, 1/2]. A
γ-histogram for S, denoted by HistγS , is the histogram of S over the γ-partitionPγ , i.e., a mapping
Hist
γ
S : {1, . . . ,
⌈
1/γ
⌉} → N defined as HistγS(j) = ∑x∈S 1 (x ∈ Iγj ), for j = 1, . . . , ⌈1/γ⌉.
A 1/2-shifted γ-histogram for S, denoted by ĤistγS , is a histogram of S over the 1/2-shifted γ-
partition P̂γ .
Definition 5.3 (Procedure GenHist). Let GenHist be an algorithm that takes as inputs a finite
multi-set S ⊂ [0, 1] and γ-partition of the unit interval (or 1/2-shifted partition), and outputs the
γ-histogram HistγS (or the 1/2-shifted γ-histogram Ĥist
γ
S) for S.
Our algorithm ASL−Quer can be described via two logical phases: first, it invokes a private
learner APrvLearn (Algorithm 7), which uses a generic non-private learner B to construct a private
classifier HPriv (Algorithm 8). To be more specific, on input dataset D, APrvLearn splits D into
k equal-sized, non-overlapping chunks D̂1, . . . , D̂k, and runs B on each of them separately. The
resulting soft-label classifiers hD̂1 , . . . , hD̂k are then used to construct a private classifier HPriv. In
the second logical phase, HPriv is used to answer classification queries in the form of public feature
vectors {x1, . . . , xm} ⊆ X . In particular, answering a query xℓ is simply done by evaluating
HPriv(xℓ), that is, running HPriv on input xℓ.
Algorithm 6 ASL−Quer: Private Algorithm for Soft-Label Classification Queries
Input: Private training datasetD ∈ (X × Y)n, a (non-private) learner B, sample-splitting param-
eter k, number of queries m ∈ N, Query set Q = {x1, · · · , xm} ⊆ X , procedure GenHist,
discretization parameter γ ∈ (0, 1/2], privacy parameters ǫ, δ > 0, cutoff parameter T ∈ [m]
1: c← 0, λ←√64T log(2/δ)/ǫ, w ← λ · log (4m/δ), and AUX← {GenHist, γ, λ, w}
2: Run APrvLearn to render the classifier HPriv: HPriv (· ; h1, . . . , hk,AUX) ←
APrvLearn (D,B, k,AUX)
3: for ℓ ∈ [m] and c ≤ T do
4: (sˆ(xℓ), Flag)← HPriv (xℓ ; AUX)
5: if Flag = 1 then
6: if sˆ(xℓ) = ⊥ then c← c+ 2, ŵ ← w + Lap(λ)
7: else c← c+ 1
8: Output the estimated score: sˆ(xℓ)
Note that the first logical phase ends with APrvLearn outputting (rendering) an algorithm HPriv.
This may be an unusual way of describing an algorithm’s output, but we purposefully do this to
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Algorithm 7 APrvLearn: Private Learner for Soft-Label Classification
Input: Private training datasetD ∈ (X × Y)n, a (non-private) learner B, sample-splitting parame-
ter k, parameters for building the output classifier: AUX =
{
Procedure GenHist, discretization
parameter γ ∈ (0, 1/2], privacy noise scale λ > 0, threshold w > 0}.
1: Split the dataset D into k non-overlapping chunks D̂1, · · · , D̂k each of size n′ , n/k.
2: for j = 1, . . . , k do
3: hj ← B(D̂j)
4: Output the classifier algorithm HPriv ( · ; h1, . . . , hk, AUX)
be able to make statements concerning some properties of learners, where we compare the non-
private learner B and our algorithm. Since the final algorithm ASL−Quer is itself not technically a
learner3, we need to divide the execution of ASL−Quer into two logical phases so that we can have
a well-defined private learner APrvLearn which we can compare to its non-private analog B.
The Private Classifier HPriv
The key component of algorithmAPrvLearn is the classifier HPriv. It is easy to see that the operation
of HPriv is a tweaked version of a single iteration inside Algorithm 4. In particular, given a query x,
classifier HPriv creates a set S containing the k soft predictions of the classifiers h1, . . . , hk which
were produced by B earlier (based on a partition of the original dataset). The tweak here is to create
a discretization (partition) of the range [0, 1] that is independent of the knowledge of S, enabling
us to construct a histogram for S, and hence, proceed as in Algorithm 4.
High-level description: Our classifier is based on testing for stability first on Hist
γ
S in the same
fashion as done in Algorithm 4. If HPriv passes the test, i.e., Hist
γ
S is sufficiently stable, it outputs
the mid-point of the bin with the maximum count, and proceeds in the usual manner. If it fails the
test, then rather than directly responding with⊥, HPriv adds fresh noise to the stability threshold w
and performs another test, but this time on Ĥist
γ
S . If it passes the test, it outputs the mid-point of
the interval with the maximum count. If it fails again, then it outputs ⊥. Once ASL−Quer receives
a response, before passing on the next query to HPriv, it decides based on the last response of
HPriv whether or not it should increment the privacy budget counter c (and if so, by how many
increments), and whether or not to add fresh noise to the stability threshold w.
Dependence of the guarantees on γ: Our goal is to take advantage of scenarios where there is
sufficient concentration in the predictions of the k classifiers, and hence an ideal setting for γ would
be about the same as the width of the concentration interval.
Per-query precision parameters: Despite the fact that our algorithm is described for a fixed
initial precision γ for all the queries, it can be trivially extended to a more general setting where
a possibly different discretization parameter γℓ is chosen for the query xℓ. The choice of γℓ can
then be decided, for example, based on some prior information about the quality of the query (e.g.,
a rough estimate of the variance in the soft prediction for the queried feature vector). In such a
3A learner outputs a classifier, i.e., a mapping from X to [0, 1], while ASL−Quer outputs a sequence of soft-labels
as responses to the queried feature vectors.
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Algorithm 8 HPriv: Private Soft-Label Classifier
Input: Domain point (feature vector) x ∈ X ; collection of soft-label classifiers h1, . . . , hk, pro-
cedure GenHist, discretization parameter γ ∈ (0, 1/2], privacy noise scale λ > 0, threshold
w > 0.
1: Create a multiset S = {h1(x), · · · , hk(x)}.
2: Initialize Flag = 0, and let HistγS ← GenHist (S, γ, Flag).
3: dist ← max
{
0,
(
max
v∈[1/γ]
Hist
γ
S(v)− second max
v∈[1/γ]
Hist
γ
S(v)
)
− 1
}
, and d̂ist ← dist +
Lap (2λ).
4: if d̂ist > ŵ then
5: v∗ ← arg max
v∈[1/γ]
Hist
γ
S(v), sˆ(x)← (2 v∗ − 1) γ/2.
6: else
7: ŵ ← w + Lap(λ), Flag = 1, and ĤistγS ← GenHist (S, γ, Flag).
8: dist ← max
{
0,
(
max
v∈[1/γ−1]
Ĥist
γ
S(v)− second max
v∈[1/γ−1]
Ĥist
γ
S(v)
)
− 1
}
, d̂ist ← dist +
Lap (2λ).
9: if d̂ist > ŵ then v∗ ← arg max
v∈[1/γ−1]
Ĥist
γ
S(v), sˆ(x)← v∗ γ.
10: else sˆ(x)← ⊥.
11: Output estimated score and discretization type flag (sˆ(x), Flag).
case, if there is a good reason to believe beforehand that soft prediction is expected to have large
variance given the feature vector, then the algorithm may choose to set the discretization parameter
to a larger value (leading to a coarser partition), thus potentially reducing the privacy budget (or
answering more queries with the same budget). We use the same precision for all queries for
simplicity.
Theorem 5.4 (Privacy Guarantee of ASL−Quer). Algorithm 6 is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private
Proof. The proof follows almost along the lines of the proofs of Corollary 3.10 and Theorem 3.6.
The only difference here is that for every unstable query, we answer two sub-queries (one for each
discretization), and we may pay an extra unit in the privacy budget counter. Hence, to correct for
this increase, we effectively replace the factor T with 2 T in the noise and threshold parameters in
Algorithm 3, and also replace δ with δ/2, which explains the extra factors of 2 in their respective
settings in ASL−Quer.
Next, we discuss a utility guarantee for Algorithm ASL−Quer. Here, we provide a very general
statement that does not particularly make assumptions about the underlying learner B. Before we
state the general utility guarantee, we provide some useful definitions.
Definition 5.5 (d-stable histogram). Let d ∈ N. LetR be a finite domain. A histogramHistS : R → N
for a finite set S ⊂ R is said to be d-stable ifmax
{
1,max
v∈R
HistS(v)− secondmax
v∈R
HistS(v)
}
> d.
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If |R| = 1, then the resulting histogram has trivially a single bin with count S. In such a case, it is
trivially d-stable for all d < |S|.
Moreover, let Sℓ denote the set constructed in Step 1 ofHPriv (Algorithm 8) during its invocation
for the ℓ-th query xℓ, i.e., Sℓ = {h1(xℓ), . . . , hk(xℓ)}.
Theorem 5.6 (General utility guarantee forASL−Quer). Let d = 32 log
(
8mT
min(δ,β)
)√
4 T log(2/δ)/ǫ,
and fix any 1/γ ∈ N. Define G0(d) = {ℓ ∈ [m] : HistγSℓ is d−stable}, and G1(d) = {ℓ ∈
[m] \ G0(d) : Ĥist
γ
Sℓ
is d−stable}. If |G0(d)| ≥ m − T , then with probability at least 1 − β,
ASL−Quer (Algorithm 6) answers all m queries such that the output scores satisfy i) for ℓ ∈ G0,
sˆ(xℓ) = γ/2 ·
(
2 arg max
v∈[1/γ]
Hist
γ
Sℓ
(v)− 1
)
; and ii) for ℓ ∈ G1, sˆ(xℓ) = γ · arg max
v∈[1/γ−1]
Ĥist
γ
Sℓ
(v).
Proof. The proof of the first part follows exactly on the lines of Corollary 3.9, with the caveat that
when we apply the sparse vector analysis, we replace β with β/2.
It remains to prove the second item. Combining the stability property of queries in G1 with
Theorem 3.5 (with ǫ← ǫ/2√2T log(2/δ), δ ← δ/2m, β ← β/4mT ), the proof follows.
Next, we provide a stronger utility guarantee for Algorithm 6 under natural conditions on B. In
particular, under a stability condition on B, together with a natural condition on the expected value
of the soft predictions generated by an output classifier of B, we show that w.h.p., for every query,
the generated score by ASL−Quer is tightly concentrated around the expected value of the soft-label
generated by B. Hence, our algorithm provides high-confidence guarantees on the output scores
when only expectation guarantees are assumed about the underlying non-private learner. That is,
our algorithm not only provides responses that are almost as accurate as the expected predictions
of the non-private learner, but also boosts the confidence of the generated scores. This is achieved
at the expense of increasing the sample size of the non-private learner by at most a factor of
≈ √T log(m/δ)/ǫ, where T can be much smaller than m in many natural settings. As will be
shown, this factor is in fact the value we set for the sample-splitting parameter k. We now define
our first condition, which is a slightly stronger version of on-average-RO (Replace-one) stability,
but weaker than uniform stability.
Definition 5.7 (α-on-average stability of a learner). Let D be any distribution over X × Y . Let
D ∼ Dn, and V = {z′1, z′2, . . . , z′n} ∼ Dn be independent of D. Let D(j) be the dataset resulting
from replacing the j-th entry in D with z′j . Let B be a (possibly randomized) learner that, on an
input dataset D, outputs a function hD : X → [0, 1]. Algorithm B is α-on-average stable if for
any x ∈ X , we have 1
n
∑n
j=1 EB,D,V
[|hD(x)− hD(j)(x)|2] ≤ α2, where the expectation is taken over
internal randomness of B, and the data points inD, V .
Note that, in general, α can depend on n. We will not explicitly express such a dependency in
the notation as long as it is clear from the context.
Remark: The standard way to define stability notions is usually done with respect to some fixed
loss function ℓ(h(x), y), for example, via a bound on 1
n
∑n
j=1 EB,D,V
[|ℓ (hD(x), y˜)− ℓ (hD(j)(x), y˜)|]
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for all x, y. However, under some standard and natural assumptions on the loss function, one can
show that the latter implies our definition given above (up to some constant).
Since we allow for randomized learners, we will use notation that explicitly accounts for the
internal randomness of the learner for clarity. Let R be a random variable that denotes the random
coins of B. Hence, we can express B as a deterministic function of (D,R), where D is the input
dataset. This way, we can easily point to the two sources of randomness in the output classifier.
Moreover, for a given realization of the random coins r ∼ R, we let h(r)D denote the output of
B(D, r). We now state the following lemma.
Lemma 5.8. Let B be α-on-average stable (soft-label) classification learner. Let D be any distri-
bution over X × Y . Let D̂ be a dataset of n′ i.i.d. examples from X × Y drawn according to D.
Then, for any fixed x ∈ X , we have P
r∼R, D̂∼Dn′
[∣∣h(r)
D̂
(x)− E
D̂∼Dn′
[
h
(r)
D̂
]
(x)
∣∣ ≤ 4α√2n′] ≥ 3/4,
where the probability is taken over both the random coins r of B and the dataset D̂. Note that the
expectation inside the probability is only over D̂ (for fixed random coins r).
Proof. Fix a domain point x ∈ X . Let V = {z′1, . . . , z′n′} ∼ Dn′ that is independent of D̂. By
Definition 5.7, observe that Markov’s inequality implies
P
r∼R
[
1
n′
n′∑
j=1
E
D̂,V
[∣∣h(r)
D̂
(x)− h(r)
D̂(j)
(x)
∣∣2] > 8α2] ≤ 1/8.
Let RG =
{
r : 1
n′
∑n′
j=1 E
D̂,V
[∣∣h(r)
D̂
(x)− h(r)
D̂(j)
(x)
∣∣2] ≤ 8α2}, that is, the set of random coins
for which the mean squared differences in predictions is bounded. Note that P
r∼RG
[r ∼ RG ] ≥ 7/8.
Fix any r ∈ RG . Observe by Steele’s inequality for bounding the variance [Ste86], we have
Var
D̂
[
h
(r)
D̂
(x)
]
≤ 1
2
n′∑
j=1
E
D̂,V
[∣∣h(r)
D̂
(x)− h(r)
D̂(j)
(x)
∣∣2] ≤ 4α2n′
Hence, by Chebyshev’s inequality, we get:
P
D̂
[∣∣h(r)
D̂
(x)− E
D̂
[
h
(r)
D̂
(x)
] ∣∣ > 4α√2n′] < 1/8
Putting these together, we conclude that with probability at least 3/4 over the random coins of
B and the randomness of the dataset D̂, we have ∣∣h(r)
D̂
(x)− E
D̂
[
h
(r)
D̂
(x)
] ∣∣ ≤ 4α√2n′.
This lemma basically says that if B is α-on-average stable, then for any domain point x, the
set of pairs (r, D̂) for which h
(r)
D̂
(x) is far from its expectation over D̂ by more than ≈ α√n′ has
probability measure less than 1/8. Clearly, this result becomes useful when α ≪ 1/√n′. This
is indeed the case for several learners, most notably for SGD. We show in Section 5 that SGD is
O(1/n′) on-average stable (implication from [HRS15, Theorem 3.9]) under standard assumptions
on the loss function used for training.
Interlude: SGD satisfies on-average stability. [HRS15] show that SGD with specific forms of
randomization satisfies uniform stability, which is stronger than our notion of on-average stability.
We show in Section 5 that any standard SGD, including the (deterministic) one-pass version, sat-
isfies on-average stability. We recover the same bounds obtained in [HRS15], but for on-average
stability. Our result on SGD also emphasizes the relevance of our results in this section, since we
will show that instantiating the non-private learner B in algorithm APrvLearn with an on-average
stable learner provides strong accuracy guarantees for our private algorithms.
Now, for results concerning the utility of our private algorithm, we will also assume the fol-
lowing condition that is commonly satisfied for a wide range of popular randomized learners.
Definition 5.9 (Consistent randomization). Let D be any distribution over X ×Y . Let n ∈ N, and
x ∈ X be any domain point. A randomized learner B is said to have consistent randomization if for
any pair of realizations of its random coins r1, r2, we have E
D∼Dn
[
h
(r1)
D (x)
]
= E
D∼Dn
[
h
(r2)
D (x)
]
.
In such a case, we denote the common value of the expectations as E
D∼Dn
[
hBD(x)
]
.
Note that the popular permutation-based SGD is one good example of a randomized learner
that has consistent randomization and satisfies on-average stable (e.g., by the results of [HRS15]).
Corollary 5.10. In Algorithm APrvLearn, let B be an α-on-average stable learner with consistent
randomization. Let x ∈ X , β ′ ∈ (0, 1), and S = {h1(x), . . . , hk(x)}. If the sample-splitting
parameter k ≥ 72 log
(
1
β′
)
, then
∣∣∣∣{v ∈ S : |v − E
D̂∼Dn′
[
hB
D̂
]
| ≤ 4α√2n′
}∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2k3 w.p. at least
1− β ′.
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 5.8, and the Chernoff-Hoeffding’s bound (as in Theo-
rem 3.11).
To provide stronger guarantees for our private learner APrvLearn (and hence, for ASL−Quer), we
will instantiate the non-private learner B used by ASL−Quer with an on-average stable learner with
consistent randomization. Our guarantees involve some notion of quality of the soft predictions
generated via the non-private learner B. Roughly speaking, we define the quality of a soft-label by
how close it is to either 0 or 1 (either in expectation, or with high probability over the randomness
in both the input training set and the learner). This notion captures the level of confidence of
a classifier produced by B about the true nature of the underlying hard label for a given feature
vector. This is because a soft-label can be viewed as an estimate for the true conditional distribution
p(y = 1|x).
We formally define two versions of this notion of quality for a learner with respect to a feature
vector. The first (Definition 5.11) is a phrased in terms of an expectation guarantee on the soft
prediction generated via a given learner for a given feature vector, whereas the second (Defini-
tion 5.12) is a stronger version phrased in terms of a high-probability guarantee on the same. In
particular, one can think of the second definition as a “boosted” version of the first . Note that these
notions depend on both the learner and the queried feature vector.
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Definition 5.11 (ν-weak quality). Let ν ∈ [0, 1/2]. A randomized learner B is said to have ν-weak
quality for a domain point x ∈ X if E
r∼R, D∼Dn
[
h
(r)
D (x)
]
< ν, or E
r∼R, D∼Dn
[
h
(r)
D (x)
]
> 1− ν.
An instantiation for weak quality: In scenarios with relatively low label noise, that is, when the
conditional probabilities p(y = 0|x), p(y = 1|x) of the true hard label given a feature vector x are
sufficiently far from each other for most x, i.e., when |p(y = 0|x)− p(y = 1|x)| is relatively large
with high probability over the choice of x, a learner that generates sufficiently accurate soft-labels
(i.e., good estimates for p(1|x)) will satisfy the above notion of quality with small ν for all except
a small fraction of the queried feature vectors.
As an instantiation of the above scenario, consider the following simple example. Let the feature
space X be R\(−c, c) for some c > 0. For x ∈ X , let y = sign(x+ z), where z ∼ N
(
c2
8
)
. Here,
N(σ2) represents the zero-mean Gaussian distribution with variance σ2. From the properties of the
Gaussian distribution, we have the following distribution on the labels:
p(y = 1|x) =
{
> 1− exp(−4x2/c2), if x > c
< exp(−4x2/c2), if x < −c
Therefore, we have thatmin
x∈X
|p(y = 1|x)− p(y = 0|x)| > 1− 2e−4 ≈ 0.96. In particular, we have
min
x∈X
(max{p(y = 1|x), p(y = 0|x)}) = 1− e−4 ≈ 0.98.
Now, if we have a soft-label learner B that outputs an (α, β)-accurate soft-label classifier hD
on input dataset D ∼ Dn, i.e., we have
∣∣∣ E
D∼Dn
[hD(x)]− p(y = 1|x)
∣∣∣ ≤ α w.p. at least 1 − β over
x ∈ X , then we have (α + 0.02)-weak quality for B for at least 1 − β fraction of queries x ∈ X .
Thus, any good learner is expected to satisfy our notion of weak-quality for a significantly large
fraction of queries in such scenarios. For example, assume that B fits a logistic regression model
to a sufficiently large dataset D (whose labels are generate as in the above example). For model
parameters
(
ω
(0)
D , ω
(1)
D
)
, the expected value (w.r.t. D) of the soft-label prediction
exp(ω
(0)
D
+ω
(1)
D
x)
1+exp(ω
(0)
D
+ω
(1)
D
x)
will be very close to 0 or 1 w.h.p. over x ∈ X .
We now define a stronger version of our notion of quality.
Definition 5.12 ((ν, β)-strong quality). Let ν ∈ [0, 1/2], β ∈ (0, 1). A randomized learner B is
said to have (ν, β)-strong quality for a domain point x ∈ X if h(r)D (x) < ν or h(r)D (x) > 1− ν with
probability at least 1− β over the random coins r of B and the choice of D ∼ Dn.
We now give the main results of this section. We view the input dataset D to ASL−Quer as a set
of n i.i.d. data points drawn from a distribution D. We first give the following lemma.
Lemma 5.13 (Non-private weak quality ⇒ private strong quality). Let β ′ ∈ (0, 1). Consider
APrvLearn (Algorithm 7). Set k = 3
(√
5λ log(2/β ′) + w
)
, where λ and w are the input parameters
defined in APrvLearn. Let B be any α-on-average stable learner (w.r.t. input datasets of size n′ =
n/k) with consistent randomization. Let ν ∈ [0, 1/2], and x ∈ X be any domain point. Set
γ = 16α
√
2n′ + ν (assuming, w.l.o.g. that 1/γ is an integer). Suppose that B has ν-weak quality
28
for x (w.r.t. input datasets of size n′). Then, w.p. at least 1 − β ′, the output classifier HPriv
of APrvLearn satisfies
∣∣∣∣HPriv(x)− E
D̂∼Dn′
[
hB
D̂
(x)
]∣∣∣∣ ≤ 8α√2n′ + ν/2. Consequently, APrvLearn has
(ν ′, β ′)-strong quality for x, where ν ′ = 8α
√
2n′ + ν/2.
Proof. Let S = (h1(x), . . . , hk(x)) constructed in Step 1 of HPriv. By Corollary 5.10, and the ν-
weak quality of B for x, we get that if k ≥ 72 log(2/β ′) with probability at least 1 − β ′/2, at least
2k/3 points of S lie in either the leftmost or the rightmost interval of Pγ . Hence, HistγS is a k/3-
stable histogram (see Definition 5.5). By following a similar line as of the proof of Corollary 3.9,
we can show that if we also have k/3 ≥ √5λ log(2/β ′)+w with probability at least 1−β ′/2, then
HPriv will pass the first distance-to-stability test (Step 9) with probability at least 1−β ′, and hence,
output the center of the interval of Pγ where E
D̂∼Dn′
[
hB
D̂
(x)
]
lies. This interval, as noted above,
must also be either the leftmost or the rightmost interval of Pγ . This completes the proof.
Now, we give our main theorem.
Theorem 5.14 (Utility guarantee forASL−Quer via on-average stability and weak-quality). Let β ∈
(0, 1). In Algorithm 6, set k = 136 log (8mT/min(β, δ))
√
2T log(2/δ)/ǫ, and γ = 16α
√
2n′+ν.
Suppose that the learner B is α-on-average stable learner (w.r.t. input sample size n′ = n/k) with
consistent randomization. Let ν ∈ [0, 1/2]. Let G(ν) , {ℓ ∈ [m] : B has ν-weak quality for xℓ} .
If |G(ν)| ≥ m−T , then w.p. at least 1−β,ASL−Quer answers allm queries (without outputting⊥),
and for all ℓ ∈ [m], the output score sˆ(xℓ) satisfies
∣∣∣∣sˆ(xℓ)− E
D̂∼Dn′
[
hB
D̂
(xℓ)
] ∣∣∣∣ ≤ 8α√2n′ + ν/2.
Theorem 5.14 shows that, under the conditions of on-average stability and weak quality, with
high probability, for every query Algorithm ASL−Quer is guaranteed to output a score that is close
to the expected score E
D̂∼Dn′
[
hB
D̂
(xℓ)
]
generated via B regardless of the value of E
D̂∼Dn′
[
hB
D̂
(xℓ)
]
.
Note that, as discussed earlier, there are various natural settings where the on-average stability
parameter α is o
(
1/
√
n′
)
.
Proof. The first part of the proof follows the same outline of that of Theorem 3.11. By combining
Corollary 5.10 with the setting for the discretization width γ, we can follow the same line of the
proof of Theorem 3.11 to conclude that by setting k as in the theorem statement, with probability
at least 1 − β, all queries in G(ν) will be answered. Thus, by the setting we chose for γ and the
weak quality property of the queries ℓ ∈ G(ν), we get
∣∣∣∣sˆ(xℓ)− E
D̂∼Dn′
[
hB
D̂
(xℓ)
] ∣∣∣∣ ≤ 8α√2n′+ν/2.
Now, it remains to show that the same accuracy guarantee holds for the queries not in G(ν).
For the remainder of the proof, we will condition on the event in first part of the proof. Fix any
query xℓ such that ℓ /∈ G(ν). Let Sℓ = (h1(xℓ), . . . , hk(xℓ)) as constructed in Step 1 of HPriv, and
Cℓ ,
[
E
D̂
[
hB
D̂
]
− 4α√2n′,E
D̂
[
hB
D̂
]
+ 4α
√
2n′
]
. We know that this interval contains at least 2k/3
points from Sℓ (Recall that we already conditioned on the high probability event that all queries
satisfy the condition in Corollary 5.10). Note that in general, Cℓ may intersect with at most two
adjacent intervals in the partition Pγ . If the query passes the stability test from the first round, then
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the output score must be the mid-point of one of these two intervals. Hence, the accuracy condition
in the theorem statement will hold for xℓ in this case. If the query does not pass the first stability
test, then Cℓ must be intersecting with exactly two adjacent intervals in Pγ . From the choice of γ,
this implies that Cℓ will be completely contained in exactly one interval in the shifted discretization
P̂γ . Hence, the output score must be the center of such interval. As a result, the accuracy condition
in the theorem is satisfied in this case. This completes the proof.
Comparison with the lower bound in [DSS+15] Our results in Theorem 5.14 may seem to con-
tradict with the lower bound in [DSS+15], which implies that under some few assumptions, no
efficient differentially private algorithm can accurately estimate the expected value of more than
n2 predicates (queries) over a dataset of size n. However, we note that the attack in the lower bound
of [DSS+15] requires that the true answers of Ω(n2/γ2) queries (predicates) must arise from a “γ-
strong” distribution: a notion that captures how well-spread a distribution is (where γ determines
the degree of the ‘spread’). Interestingly, the weak quality condition in our result implies that all
but T queries are not γ-strong for any γ > 0. Hence, the aforementioned lower bound does not
apply to our setting.
SGD and α-on-average Stability
Here, we present a result establishing that SGD satisfies on-average stability. Our result does not
follow directly from the work by [HRS15] since we do not require any specific form of random-
ization, like random shuffling or sampling, to be performed on the dataset before or during the
execution of SGD. In other words, our result applies to any standard SGD method regardless of
the randomization, including the (deterministic) one-pass version of SGD.
We provide a simple argument which, roughly speaking, reduces the on-average stability of
any standard SGD method to uniform stability restricted to permutation-based SGD (where data
points are shuffled randomly prior to execution) for any problem class considered in [HRS15].
Hence, one can translate all bounds on uniform stability in [HRS15], which are only applicable
under specific randomization techniques, to bounds on on-average stability that hold without any
assumptions on the nature of the randomization. This reduction does not involve any specific
analysis of SGD, but goes through a simple argument that involves manipulating random variables
and their expectations, and uses simple properties of i.i.d. sequences. Since our analysis applies
to a more general class of problems than soft-label classification, we will modify the notation to
reflect such generality.
We will usewD to denote the final output parameter when the input isD = {z1, . . . , zn} ∼ Dn.
Let V = {z′1, . . . , z′n} be an i.i.d. sequence that is independent of D. Let z′ be another fresh
independent sample from D. As before, we define D(j) to be the dataset constructed by replacing
the j-th point inD with z′j . Let D̂
(j) be the dataset resulting from replacing the j-th entry ofD with
z′. Without loss of generality, we will define stability (both on-average and uniform) in terms of
‖wD−wD′‖ (whereD′ denotes any dataset that differs fromD in exactly one point). An algorithm
that takes a dataset D, and outputs a parameter (or a prediction rule) wD, is α-uniformly stable if
for any fixed pair of datasetsD,D′ that differ in one point, we have that E
r∼R
[‖wD −wD′‖2] ≤ α2,
where the expectation is taken over the random coins of the algorithm. Note that the bounds on
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uniform stability in [HRS15] are derived by first obtaining a bound on ‖wD − wD′‖, which is
then used to bound the difference in the loss function evaluated on D and D′ in a straightforward
manner (using standard properties like Lipschitz boundedness, and smoothness). Hence, the final
bounds are constant factors away from the original bound on the parameters. For consistency with
the way we define on-average stability earlier, we prefer to focus our notation on the parameter
space. We note that our result would still apply if we define stability in terms of the loss. We now
state our result.
Theorem 2. Let A be any (randomized) learner (e.g., SGD) that, on input dataset D, outputs a
parameter vector wD. Let σ : [n] → [n] be a random permutation. Let σ(D) = {zσ(1), . . . , zσ(n)}
denote the dataset resulting from applying σ on the indices of D = {z1, . . . , zn}. If A (σ (·)) is
α-uniformly stable, then A is α-on-average stable.
Proof. Let D ∼ Dn. Let r ∼ R denote the random coins of A (if any). Observe that since z′ and
zj , j ∈ [n] are i.i.d., we have
1
n
n∑
j=1
E
r,D,D(j)
[‖wD(x)−wD(j)(x)‖2] = 1n
n∑
j=1
E
r,D,D̂(j)
[‖wD(x)−wD̂(j)(x)‖2] (1)
Note that the term inside the j-th expectation in the RHS is a function of D, D̂(j). For ev-
ery j ∈ [n], create a new dataset D˜(j) by replacing the first entry in D̂(j) (i.e., z1) by zj , i.e.,
D˜(j) = {zj , z2, z3, . . . , zj−1, z′, zj+1, . . . , zn}. Also, construct another dataset D(j)∗ which is iden-
tical to D except that z1 and zj are swapped. Observe that D˜
(1) = D̂(1), and D
(1)
∗ = D. Now,
for j = 2, . . . , n, we argue that the pair (D
(j)
∗ , D˜(j)) is identically distributed to the pair (D, D̂(j)).
Note that the only relevant random variables, paired according to their respective positions, are
(z1, z1), (zj , z
′) (from (D, D̂(j))) and (zj , zj), (z1, z
′) (from (D
(j)
∗ , D˜(j))), respectively. It is
easy to see that the first group is identically distributed to the second, as the joint distribution
p ((z1, z1), (zj, z
′)) = p(z1)p(zj)p(z
′) = p ((zj , zj), (z1, z
′)).
For every j ∈ [n], we can now safely replace D with D(j)∗ , and D̂(j) with D˜(j). Note that all
D
(j)
∗ have the same data points as D, except they may be shuffled. Also, observe that all D˜(j)
contain the same data points z2, . . . , zn and z
′, with z′ being the j-th entry of D˜(j). Hence, from
equation 1, we have:
1
n
n∑
j=1
E
r,D,D̂(j)
[‖wD(x)−wD̂(j)(x)‖2] = 1n
n∑
j=1
E
r,D
(j)
∗ ,D˜(j)
[
‖w
D
(j)
∗
(x)−wD˜(j)(x)‖2
]
= E
j←[n]
[
E
r,D
(j)
∗ ,D˜(j)
[
‖w
D
(j)
∗
(x)−wD˜(j)(x)‖2
]]
Here, the outer expectation is taken over j drawn uniformly from [n] (in place of the average over
the indices). Note that the location of z′ is hence uniformly random over [n]. Let σ be a random
permutation over [n]. Note that since the marginal distribution of σ(1) is uniform over [n], we can
write the above expectation as
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E
j←σ(1)
[
E
r,D
(j)
∗ ,D˜(j)
[
‖w
D
(j)
∗
(x)−wD˜(j)(x)‖2
]]
For any j ∈ [n], let σ|j = (σ(2), . . . , σ(n)) denote the permutation induced by σ on the
positions of the dataset ranging from 2 to n conditioned on the event that σ(1) = j. Since any
permutation of an i.i.d. sequence is still i.i.d. (by exchangeability of i.i.d. random variables), then
for any fixed j ∈ [n], the pair
(
D
(j)
∗ , D˜(j)
)
is identically distributed to
(
σ|j
(
D
(j)
∗
)
, σ|j
(
D˜(j)
))
.
Hence, the above expression can be written as
E
j←σ(1)
[
E
σ|j
[
E
r,D
(j)
∗ ,D˜(j)
[
‖w
σ|j
(
D
(j)
∗
)(x)−wσ|j(D˜(j))(x)‖
2
]]]
Note that when j ← σ(1), we have σ|j
(
D
(j)
∗
)
= σ
(
D
(1)
∗
)
and σ|j
(
D˜(j)
)
= σ
(
D˜(1)
)
.
Hence, using this fact, combining the outer expectations, and swapping the order of expectations,
we get
E
r,D
(1)
∗ ,D˜(1)
[
E
σ
[
‖w
σ
(
D
(1)
∗
)(x)−wσ(D˜(1))(x)‖2
]]
Note that D
(1)
∗ and D˜(1) may differ only in their first position (the first entry in D
(1)
∗ is z1
whereas the first entry in D˜(1) is z′). Thus, since A (σ (·)) is α-uniformly stable, the inner expec-
tation is bounded by α2, proving that A is α-on-average-stable.
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